transubstantiated into something like the reasoned rule of cultivated Guardians in the ideal Republic as Plato imagined it. 8 Recruitment to guardianship, or, more prosaically, to the statut de fonctionnaire, was supposed to be based on demonstrated competence, but in the absence of anything that might be characterized as a functional administrative science, "general culture" became the real shibboleth distinguishing the washed from the unwashed. Careers were open to talent, but opportunities for talent to be recognized were not uniformly distributed across France and Navarre. To prepare for anointment, it was best to live in a city of some size. There, in a proper lycée, one could absorb passages from an approved digest of the officially sanctioned canon and learn to expound pithy encapsulations of the tradition itself, such as, "Corneille portrays men as they ought to be, Racine as they are" (dixit La Bruyère)-as neat a formulation of the underlying dualism of the culture-power system as one could wish.
If bureaucrats were the secular clergy of the literary religion, the literati were the regular clergy. Their cloister was the Nouvelle Revue Française [slide] , that outpost of eternity in the Sixth Arrondissement (where the French publishing industry is concentrated) [slide] . Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, these monks of Saint-Germain des Prés repaired during the summer to an authentic albeit deconsecrated abbey [slide] in the village of Pontigny, where they discoursed on sublimities ranging from the venal in Villon to the categorical imperative in Kant.
The décades of Pontigny had in fact begun before the First World War, prolonging the Symbolist revolt against Naturalism. Zola's approach to the marketplace had been as crass as that of the capitalists who peopled his pages. Gallimard's monks wanted no part of it. The first edition of Gide's Immoraliste numbered only 300 copies. It was an "adventure," he confided to his diary, not a business venture. His only profit would be "amusement," proof of the author's highmindedness and evidence that, in France at least, the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism did not coincide. 9 Pontigny was a Cistercian abbey, and its latter-day literary monks had much in common with the original Cistercians: both aimed to purify a prior order of things, to restore respect for a lost ideal.
This division of labor between secular bureaucrats and regular men of letters encouraged a subtle symbiosis: "Parnassus," as Marc Fumaroli [slide] once put it, "is a mountain with gentle slopes," [slide] by which he meant that in his ideal republic the gods and the mortals can indulge a certain intimacy without ever forgetting which occupies the mountaintop. 10 Humanism promised knowledge of man in the abstract. Abstract knowledge of man as he is in himself, independent of his various social incarnations, promised impartiality in administrative decisions. Impartiality bestowed legitimacy on the state administration and the promise of transcending particularist interests and partisan bias. At every level we find duality: dualism of elite and non-elite, of man and men, and of the literary world as transsubstantiation of the real.
The Organic Configuration [slide]
This dualism would prove to be unstable, however. Its disintegration began with the Depression. Disdain for the material support of high culture was exposed for the delusion it was when that support crumbled in the Crash. Within a few years, engagement--meaning 9 Eric Deschodt, Gide: Le Contemporain capital (Paris: Perrin, 1991), p. 119. 10 Marc Fumaroli, "L'Académie française," in Pierre Nora, ed., Les Lieux de mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1995 If humanism could now be invoked as warrant for the brutal treatment of indigenous peoples that Gide had witnessed in the Congo, the humanist cultural configuration could no longer stand. Rather than a hierarchy of values in which man trumped men, a new hierarchy emerged in which men, now rebaptized the masses or das Volk, took precedence on both right and left. Writers ceased to be content if they reached only the happy few. They gladly sacrificed aesthetic fastidiousness on the altar of topical relevance: when Ramon Fernandez [slide], the leading NRF critic in the interwar period, underwent a rapid evolution that took him within a few years from the otherworldliness of Pontigny to left-wing militancy to an official post in Doriot's extreme-right French Popular Party, he explained the change in his writing style by 11 André Gide, Voyage au Congo (Paris, 1925) . 12 Fernandez, Ramon, p. 452. Thierry Maulnier attempted to redefine humanism as an aesthetic not of "man" but of "European man" or of a "constructed and ordered figure of man" that was at once "national and social," that is, compatible with fascism. See David Carroll, French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and the Ideology of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 225. noting that "you don't write for 300,000 readers in the same way you write for the 300 lettered" subscribers of the NRF. 13 Tocqueville believed that religion suffers when the church mixes in temporal affairs. Only by remaining apart can it preserve its integrity and independence. Julien Benda Glorieuses the priorities of Power were clear: economic growth was the imperative, and all the country's resources had to be diverted to that end. In the power-culture couple, in other words, power was now on top.
The pre-eminent historian of French education in this period, Antoine Prost, is categorical:
"There was a Gaullian education policy. It can be summed up in one central principle: to recruit elites democratically." 15 Until the end of World War II, the prestige hierarchy in France had remained essentially medieval. The literary-philosophical configuration had been modeled on the trivium: grammar, rhetoric, logic. The quadrivium, comprising the more pragmatic and numerate branches of knowledge, was honored but less esteemed. Recognized for their practical importance, these were the disciplines of homo faber. Rulers ruled with tongue and pen, with verbal invention rather than "mechanical" labor. The disciplines of the quadrivium enhanced physical power and thus made domination possible but could not legitimate it. Legitimation required language.
12 educational system. Among the first of these was a sharper and earlier differentiation of "classic" and "modern" sections at the middle school level. 19 For a decade or more the wider cultural implications of this internal reconfiguration of the schools were not clearly perceived even by those responsible for them. This blindness stemmed from the fact that numbers were increasing on both the humanistic and scientific sides, in part because of the increases mandated by the planners, in part simply because generational cohorts were larger in the Baby Boom years and the demand from below for education was increasing, as the economic and status rewards of advanced schooling became increasingly apparent.
Indeed, if the number of university professors in the sciences tripled between 1950 and 1971, the number in letters and human sciences more than quadrupled. 20 But "letters and human sciences" no longer described the same cultural field as literature and philosophy.
By the 1970s, the relative standing of trivium and quadrivium had been reversed. Georges
Pompidou [slide], though a littérateur himself, had already put the point quite bluntly as early as 1963: "The economy lacks a great number of technicians, technical managers and engineers.
In order to overcome that problem, critical to social and economic life, a large number of pupils should be attracted to the technical section." The goal of the new school guidance program, he continued, "was to link the democratization of the education system to the economic, technical and scientific needs of the nation." A senior education bureaucrat, Jean Capelle, exhorted the state to invest "like an industrialist … according to its own interest, and … aid students who wrong to see an "anti-humanist" eruption, but they were wrong to think that henceforth antihumanists would dominate the landscape. The sixty-eighters were actually the last outcroppings of the subsiding literary continent. The organic cultural configuration had supplanted the literary: those most adept at figuring out how the world was supposed to work were selected to partake of the benefits that accrued from seeing to it that the world did in fact work as they thought it should.
The post-1968 changes in the French educational system merely ratified existing trends. now enrolls not only the best science students but also the best literature students, because it is "deemed to be more generalist and to lead to more socially prestigious careers." Indeed, "50 percent of students who study Latin and Greek now choose the S track. We can savor the irony that the enhancement of the quadrivium, urged by the Communists Wallon and Langevin in order to rehabilitate "manual labor and technical value," ultimately served to accredit belief in the rationality of the neoliberal market.
Even on the left, the old rhetoric of justice succumbed to the new gospel of efficiency. One of the most important social developments of the period was the emergence of the autogestion movement. The name in itself speaks volumes: liberation was to come no longer from conquering the commanding heights of state power but from "managing" the myriad decentralized sites among which power was disseminated. When this movement failed, the Left slid into an impasse from which it has yet to extricate itself. 27 Massification and specialization are ugly but indispensable descriptive terms for this period, in which literate bureaucrats saw themselves supplanted by organic intellectuals. The portion of each age cohort earning the baccalaureate degree increased from 20 to 64 percent. Massification meant that the audience for higher education could no longer be assumed to come from relatively homogeneous cultural strata. In 1964, when Bourdieu and Passeron published Les Héritiers, only one percent of children of working class parentage entered the sphere of higher education. Today the figure is thirty-eight percent. 28 Specialization, however, meant that one could acquire an education without acquiring a general culture. 29 Technique is easier to transmit to a highly disparate student body than sensibility. The "slopes of Parnassus," to return to Fumaroli's metaphor, ceased to be gentle.
Indeed, the single sacred mount diversified into a whole range of disciplinary peaks guarded by steep escarpments of conceptual apparatus and technical jargon. Barriers to entry were high.
The curriculum stiffened into disciplines. If education perpetually rebuilds the house of culture, postwar educational reform had ended by converting the ample prewar mansion into a warren of non-communicating apartments. More residents were squeezed into the château, but their view of the park was limited, and the fountains had been shut off in the name of efficiency.
The Industrial Configuration: An Age of Anxiety [slide]
In the two cultural configurations we have examined thus far, the state's interest was in part pragmatic: humanist culture was a signal of generalized competence; technical-scientific culture was a generator of needed skills and a hothouse for organic intellectuals. But the state also had another interest in shaping the culture, a symbolic interest: to integrate the nation. France's rich 28 Baudelot interview. Resnik reports a deputy's comment that only 8 percent of students at the collège and lycée level were of working-class parentage. 29 Baudelot interview. literary heritage became, in effect, a symbol of national unity. After that unity fractured in the 1940s, a new myth was propounded: with recognition of "the equal dignity of all social tasks," integration was supposed to flow from participation in a common project of national reconstruction.
But just as the humanistic ideal had been shattered by ugly realities-colonialism, class conflict, nationalism, and war-so, too, did the postwar rhetoric of integration by participation begin to unravel as the exigencies of recovery waned. Students were severed-not quite as
Barrès had imagined, however-from previously integrative institutions such as family, community, and even political party. The solidarities that formed among coworkers and colleagues were different from those that had forged bonds among concitoyens. At the state level, the bureaucrat had matured into a specialist in some particular domain of public management, most at home among his professional peers and increasingly distant from the rest.
The after-hours culture of the organic intellectuals became increasingly cosmopolitan.
Specialization created a demand for compensatory diversity. Product variety on the cultural market increased. Cultural goods, once scarce and expensive, became abundant and cheap, so abundant that even in the pursuit of pleasure one had no choice but to specialize. Choice no longer expressed simple taste but also a real budget constraint: time was in scarce supply. The old literary culture, a culture of self-fashioning in the sense of Stephen Greenblatt, had been a lifelong project; by contrast, leisure-time consumption is but one of many line items in the consumer's time budget. Informational inequalities created a new role for mediators of one kind or another, and hence for the media that employed them-now often mass media rather than limited-circulation literary-intellectual reviews. Culture had been industrialized. the analysis would hinge on increasing returns to scale, transaction costs, asymmetric information, reputational intermediaries, optimal size, and winner-take-all markets. Indeed, to be too deeply steeped in a national culture may have become a disadvantage in a globalized age.
Cultural conservatives decry this variety, this deracination, and this scale. Instead of a cornucopia, they see a supermarket filled with ersatz and adulterated goods. The humanist canon may have limited choice, they argue, but such limitation was healthy, the expression of a collective value judgment. To gratify all desires with cheap, tawdry cultural merchandise is to sanction a "new hedonism," Alain Finkielkraut [slide] fulminated in an essay entitled "A Pair of Boots Is As Good As Shakespeare." 30 [slide] Weber had already denounced "specialists without spirit" who "mistake this nullity for the greatest civilization the world has ever known." For Finkielkraut, the mass production of cultural wares had created something even worse. People now craved "cultural snacks, bits of culture which they can try out … and then discard. … They do not conserve but rather consume the available traditions." Even the school had been corrupted, conservatives alleged, as teachers uninterested in defending their own tradition sought to ingratiate themselves with students rather than initiate them. Hence the schools could no longer fulfill their key function: to integrate the disparate elements of society into a common culture. The volume in which this passage appears was withdrawn from circulation by its publisher in the wake of the ensuing polemic. Nevertheless, Finkielkraut, himself a Jewish contributor to
Listeners of
France Culture but an admirer of Camus, had invited the writer to discuss another of his books, A tempest in a teapot to be sure, yet it provides an answer to the question I raised at the beginning: Why are French declinists so vociferous in their insistence that everything, and especially culture, is going to hell in a handbasket, while others are persuaded that culture has resisted better than other aspects of France's collective existence? The answer is that the commodification of culture and diversification of the market have made it possible to satisfy the cultural demands of a larger proportion of the population than ever before. The market can supply everyone with everything except the power to determine what other people should value; hence cultural homogeneity can no longer be enforced. Now, this lamented cultural homogeneity was always something of an elite illusion. In the literary-philosophical age, as we have seen, only a tiny percentage of the population was exposed in any serious way to the great literary tradition that was supposed to found France's cultural unity. True, the schools of the Third Republic did succeed in imposing standard French as the language of the Republic, yet even here, radio and television completed the job of unification that the republican school had merely begun. 33 Under the organic regime of the postwar years, the pretense of "equal dignity of all social tasks" masked the continuing existence of a deep cultural divide. Multiculturalism was not yet an issue, so at this stage we see in its pure form the reality of educational mobility in an 33 Michel Braudeau and Pierre Encrevé, Conversations sur la langue française (Paris: Gallimard, 2007) . advanced industrial society: even in the eras of greatest mobility, opportunity was strictly limited. For even with the significant expansion of secondary and higher education in the second half of the twentieth century, the elite grew rather modestly in proportion to the total population. I deliberately misled you earlier when I indicated that 51 percent of the students taking the bac this year were in S, the most rigorous track. The correct figure is 51 percent of those who took le bac général. In the Byzantine complexity of the French educational system, there are in fact three lycées and three bacs (général, technologique, and professionnel).
When we look at the numbers more carefully, we find that the lycée général now serves roughly 60 percent of each age cohort, and 51 percent of its students are in track S [slide] . That works out to about 30 percent of each age cohort in the "upper" level of the educational system (table 2) . In other words, after forty years of reform and expansion of secondary and higher education post-1968, the "elite" group of students has grown from 20 percent of an age cohort to 25 or 30. Fully 70 percent of the population still cannot aspire to the level of culture that the conservatives feel called upon to defend. 34 Most people never acquire the tools [slide] .
Immigration has altered the complexion of the problem-literally-but not the substance.
The failure of the reformed school system to fulfill its promise of "equal dignity for all social tasks" has been blamed on the supposed "inassimilability" of the newcomers. The gift of a rich cultural tradition is laid at their door, we are told, but they refuse to accept it. They prefer to cling to their culture of origin, even though it leaves them ill-equipped to meet the demands of the host society. But to say this is to mistake the root of the problem. The gift of elite republican culture, transmitted gratis by the schools in conformity with the dictates of republican 34 Descoings, "Préconisations," p. 22. egalitarianism, was always left largely untouched by the majority of students, most of whom never laid eyes on it. In the industrial era of culture, the emblematic figure is not the schoolteacher or the organic intellectual but the culture broker.
[slide] The state continues to shape the culture, but with a less free hand. It is rivaled by corporate "content providers," [slide] and its role is twofold: to maintain the infrastructure ingraining habits that impede the necessary readiness to give unstintintingly if ephemerally to the ever-changing here and now.
I therefore reiterate what I said earlier about culture's increasing independence from language and community, from rootedness in all its senses. This is one source of the anxiety about the state of today's culture. The wielders of words worry more than others, perhaps because the market is glutted with them. The new technologies have cheapened words more than other cultural goods. The books that filled the library of Alexandria can be stored in a space smaller than the period at the end of this sentence and distributed gratis. The production of images and sound, the marshaling of the large numbers of people needed to produce a film or a disk, is a more expensive and complex undertaking.
But the converse of this is that the production of what is expensive to produce tends to become concentrated in the hands of the most efficient producers. The range of expression therefore narrows to maximize the potential audience and increase returns to the successful few. Where production is cheap, the barriers to entry are lower, but the producer has no market power. Hence she must often toil in obscurity and satisfy herself with what her scanty marginal product yields in an undiscriminating marketplace. This may not be enough to sustain life. But why should we be surprised if "culture" in the loftiest, most elitist, most transcendent sense is obliged to live at the margin? Stendhal was content to write for the happy few.
And in trying to imagine the future, it may not be so farfetched to invoke the name of Stendhal [slide] . He was an early Romantic, who could look back on the collapse of two previous cultural regimes: a high-flown Renaissance-classical era, in which a rarefied literary production had been the byproduct of expanding church and state bureaucracies, and a more pragmatic and analytic Enlightenment, in which the organic intellectuals of a modernizing state had attempted to re-center the culture of their time on the evolving exigencies of life here and now. By Stendhal's day, these two earlier cultural configurations had run their course, and banished subjectivity had begun to reclaim its rights. If he were with us today, he might not feel entirely dépaysé. --[end] 
